Emotet malware being delivered through heavy Malspam Campaign

November 12, 2018

SonicWall Threat Research Lab has come across a recent spam email campaign sending fake invoice and payment receipt emails in large numbers. Email messages claim that the payment has already been made from the user’s account or the payment has been scheduled to go from their account, creating an anxiety to open the attached document for more details.

Infection Chain:

Fig 1: Infection chain of the malspam campaign delivering Emotet

This spam email campaign started few days ago, either malicious office or PDF document is attached to deliver the Emotet malware. The email shown below was sent on November 9th with the subject “Account Alert – Your recent payment notice”, attached a PDF document with the details about payment remittance.

Fig 2: spam email

PDF document is not malicious as such, it just has a web link to download the initial payload of this campaign. The document has been crafted to look genuine but the signature “Bus Banking Customer Support” looks odd though.

Fig 3: pdf attached in the spam email 

Office Document:

Clicking on the web link in the PDF document, downloads the initial payload, an office document with VB macros.

Fig 4: Office doc downloaded from the PDF web link

VB Macro:
If the user falls for the lure and enables macro, document_open() macro shown below gets executed.

Fig 5: Office VB macro code

The method Document_open() has reference to “Shapes(1).TextFrame.TextRange.Text”. Lets dig into the document to find the text frame that’s being referred.

Text frames are not visible in the above snapshot. Lets enable “Show text boundaries” under “Show document content” from Advanced Word Options.

Fig 5: Office document advanced options

Now we shall see the text frames embedded in the document.

Fig 6: Office doc with visible text frames

Lets move the content overlapping text frame text and highlight the text area.

Fig 7: Text frame area highlighted

This is the text area that holds the shell script. Shell script is hidden inside this text area

Fig 7: Shell code hidden under text frame

Just to confirm that this text area holds the malicious shell code. Copy and paste the highlighted text area multiple times, save and later view the raw document in an editor. We should see multiple copies of shell command.

Fig 7: Multiple copies of shell code 

The shell command sets the variable “OpG” & then executes the PowerShell script which refers to the set variable “OpG”.


OpG is set as shown below

Followed by the PowerShell script

PowerShell is obfuscated with the formatting operator. After applying the format, we get

“PowerShell ${ENV:comspeC}[4,26,25]-join’ ‘ item (env:Opg).value)”

1. “ENV:comspeC}[4,26,25]-join” – pulls the characters from the ComSpec environment variable string i.e “C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe”, joins and builds “IEX” which is PowerShell invoke-expression. Invoke-Expression allows the construction of dynamic PowerShell code.

2. “item” – The Get-Item cmdlet is used to get items at the specified location.

3. “(env:Opg).value” – Retrieves the value of the set variable OpG.

OpG is a zlib compressed and base64 encoded string. OpG can be decoded and decompressed using the following python script to retrieve the actual string.

Now we know that PowerShell Invoke expression script is trying to dynamically download the malicious payloads from the url’s

  • http://steelstraightening.com/sDCqr
  • http://www.fraserfrance.fr/T
  • http://rusjur.ru/3dgheWz
  • http://cisnecosmetics.com.br/T

Later, it names the downloaded payload as 866.exe and starts running it with the invoke command.

$BSz = ‘866’;


Invoke-Item $RYM;

Upon execution, 866.exe makes a copy of itself in the path “C:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\lpiograd.exe” and starts executing lpiograd.exe. lpiograd.exe is an Emotet malware, modular banking Trojan that primarily functions as a downloader or dropper of other banking Trojans.

Sonicwall Threat Research Lab provides protection against this exploit with the following signatures:

  • GAV 1506  JScript.Doc_256